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NOTES
ZONING: LOOKING BEYOND MUNICIPAL BORDERS
A municipality has been traditionally viewed as a self-contained, isolated
unit whose powers and duties are limited to the confines of its geographic
boundaries. This narrow concept of municipality has begun to break down,
especially in the field of zoning, and the artificiality of boundaries is receiv-
ing recognition.' One subject of increasing professional comment2 is legisla-
tion that empowers municipalities to control development in adjacent un-
incorporated areas.' In addition, the judiciary has begun to depart from
traditional views by considering extraterritorial factors when passing upon
the validity of municipal zoning. This note analyzes this judicial tendency
and considers future problems that will be faced by courts willing to view
zoning in a regional context.
The courts have embraced extraterritoriality in two principal types of
cases: (1) those recognizing extraterritorial factors in actions brought by
residents challenging the validity of municipal zoning and (2) those
upholding the standing of nonresidents to challenge zoning which affects
them.
I. JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION OF EXTRATERRITORIAL FACTORS
There are three basic types of extraterritorial factors which courts have
considered in determining the validity of local zoning: external zoning or
1. See generally SENGSTOcK, EXTRATERRITORIAL POWERS IN THE METROPOLITAN
AREA (1962).
2. E.g., SENOSTOCK, op. cit. supra note I at 66-69; Bartelt, Extraterritorial Zoning:
Reflections on its Validity, 32 NOTRE DAME LAW. 367 (1957); Bouwsma, Validity of
Extraterritorial Municipal Zoning, 8 VAND. L. REV. 806 (1955).
3. Although twenty-eight states have granted municipalities extraterritorial powers
in exercising subdivision controls, only a few states have granted municipalities the
power to zone extraterritorially. I MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT
232 n.3 (1963). An example of the statutes which grant extraterritorial zoning power
to municipalities is that enacted by the North Carolina legislature. It provides:
The legislative body of any municipality whose population at the time of the
latest decennial census of the United States was one thousand two hundred fifty
(1,250) or more, may exercise the powers granted in this article not only within
its corporate limits but also within the territory extending for a distance of one
mile beyond such limits in all directions; provided, that any ordinance intended
to have application beyond the corporate limits of the muncipality shall expressly
so provide, and provided further that such ordinance be adopted in accordance
with the provisions set forth herein. In the event of land lying outside a munici-
pality and lying within a distance of one mile or more than one municipality, the
jurisdiction of each such municipality shall terminate at a boundary line equidis-
tant from the respective corporate limits of such municipalities. No extraterritorial
regulations shall affect bona fide farms, but any such use of such property for non-
farm purchases shall be subject to such regulations. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160-181.2
(1964). (Emphasis added.)
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development, external facilities and regional needs. In many cases the
zoning or development in an adjacent municipality has been asserted as
evidence of the character of land located near the border of the zoning
municipality.4 In other cases facilities provided in an adjacent community
have been asserted to show that such facilities need not be provided within
the zoning municipality.5 In still other cases the needs of a surrounding
region have been asserted to help show the facilities which a local zoning
scheme sould provide.6
A. Considering Extra-municipal Zoning and Development in
Characterizing Land in the Zoning Municipality
1. Characterization in the Courts
In determining the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance or amendment
as it applies to a particular plot of land, courts have frequently character-
ized' the plot according to the zoning classification and use of surrounding
land within the zoning municipality.8 Moreover, in cases where the plot
was located on the border of the zoning municipality, several courts have
also questioned whether the character of land in an adjacent municipality
could be considered. Without exception these courts have answered this
question in the affirmative. Usually the extra-municipal zoning and develop-
ment has been asserted as evidence that the ordinance or amendment was
invalid,9 but the zoning and development of an adjacent community has
4. E.g., Huttig v. City of Richmond Heights, 372 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. 1963), in which
the landowner contended that the zoning of his land should be affected, in part, by
commercial development in an adjacent municipality.
5. E.g., Valley View Village v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955), in which the
village contended that it could exclude commercial and industrial development because
there were adequate commercial and industrial facilities in adjacent municipalities.
6. E.g., Wrigley Properties, Inc. v. City of Ladue, 369 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1963), in
which the landowner contended that a residential restriction was invalid because of the
regional need for a shopping center.
7. "Characterization" is a process by which courts evaluate the environment in
which land is located to determine whether it has been appropriately classified for zon-
ing purchases. This process involves the examination of surrounding land uses, zoning
classifications, traffic conditions and other relevant physical factors.
8. E.g., Robertson v. City of Salem, 191 F. Supp. 604 (D. Ore. 1961); People ex rel.
Joseph Lumber Co. v. City of Chicago, 402 Il1. 321, 83 N.E.2d 592 (1949); Jenckes v.
Building Comm'r, 341 Mass. 162, 167 N.E.2d 757 (1960); Kaplan v. City of Boston,
330 Mass. 381, 113 N.E.2d 856 (1953).
9. Generally the zoning and development of land in an adjacent municipality has
been asserted by the owner of the land in question as evidence that his land has been
restricted to a use for which it is unsuited. Liberty Nat'l Bank v. City of Chicago, 10
Ill. 2d 137, 139 N.E.2d 235 (1956); Hannifin Corp. v. City of Berwyn, 1 111. 2d 28,
115 N.E.2d 315 (1953); Forbes v. Hubbard, 348 I1. 166, 180 N.E. 767 (1932),
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also been asserted by the zoning municipality as evidence that an amend-
ment was valid."°
In Huttig v. City of Richmond Heights," a property owner challenged
the validity of a zoning ordinance which restricted his land to single-family
residential use. The land lay within a residential subdivision of the zoning
municipality but fronted a major traffic thoroughfare which was the
municipality's boundary. Most of the surrounding plots fronting the
thoroughfare in both the zoning municipality and the adjoining municipal-
ity contained commercial development. The Missouri Supreme Court
found that the land in question was unsuited for residential development
primarily because of the commercial uses in both municipalities." On the
basis of that finding and the fact that proposed commercial development
Louisville Timber & Wooden Prods. Co. v. City of Beechwood Village, 376 S.W.2d 690
(Ky. 1964); Huttig v. City of Richmond Heights, 372 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. 1963); Dowsey
v. Village of Kensington, 257 N.Y. 221, 177 N.E. 427 (1931). But these factors have
also been asserted by an adjacent property owner as evidence that land has been rezoned
for a use which is inharmonious with surrounding development. Borough of Cresskill v.
Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954). The rezoning of a relatively
small parcel of land to an inharmonious use is popularly referred to as spot zoning. 1
YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 90 (2d ed. 1953).
10. In two cases extra-municipal zoning and development has been asserted by the
zoning municipality to show that a rezoning was harmonious with surrounding develop-
ment. Gartland v. Borough of Maywood, 45 N.J. Super. 1, 131 A.2d 529 (1957);
tlochberg v. Borough of Freehold, 40 N.J. Super. 276, 123 A.2d 46 (1956). In Gart-
land the rezoning of land located on the municipal border from residential to commercial
was upheld primarily because of the erection of a shopping center on adjacent land in
an adjoining municipality. In Hochberg a zoning amendment authorized business uses
in an area which had previously been restricted to residential uses. This permitted the
expansion of a race track that had theretofore been a non-conforming use. The court
held the rezoning invalid because a member of the planning board who had a financial
interest failed to disqualify himself, but it indicated that the amendment would other-
wise have been upheld partially because of the commercial zoning and development of
adjacent land in an abutting municipality.
In another case extra-municipal zoning and development was asserted by the zoning
municipality to show that the owner's land was suitable for the use to which it had
been restricted. City of Louisville v. Bryan S. McCoy, Inc., 286 S.W.2d 546 (Ky.
1956). In this case the municipality had rezoned land on the municipal border from
commercial to residential. The court upheld the rezoning because of residential de-
velopment on adjacent land in both the zoning municipality and the county.
11. 372 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. 1963).
12. The court expressly stated that the zoning municipality had a duty to consider
the external zoning because "while defendants properly assert that they are not bound
by the zoning in Clayton [the adjacent municipality], it is undoubtedly true that in its
own zoning it must consider that matter, at least to some extent, from a regional stand-
point." Id. at 842. The external zoning and development which the court considered
in this case was limited to a strip of commercial development extending about three or
four blocks. This is typical of the cases considering external zoning and development
because the area considered is usually small in size and directly adjacent to the zoning
municipality.
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would not be detrimental to the zoning city, it held the restriction invalid."5
In Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont,14 the New Jersey Supreme
Court sustained an adjacent property owner's contention that a rezoning
was invalid because it authorized the land in question to be developed in a
way that was inharmonious with the surrounding development. In this case
a block located on the border of the zoning borough had been rezoned from
residential to commercial. The primary reason for the holding was that the
block was surrounded by residential development, although most of this
development was in three adjacent municipalities. The court looked beyond
the borders of the zoning municipality because the state legislature had
manifested its intention that regional factors should be considered by
local authorities.15
2. Suggested Tools for Characterization
For courts willing to consider factors external to the zoning municipality,
there is a need for analytical tools to aid in the characterization process. It
is suggested that three hypothetical situations, represented by Figures 1, 2
and 3 may serve as guides. It is assumed in each situation that an owner
desires to use commercially a plot presently zoned residential.
These Figures are abstracted from a number of problems unique to each
individual case. They are aids only to comparison of development types
existing in a given region and therefore should be disregarded in those cases
in which characterization may turn upon other considerations. (For ex-
ample, it may turn upon a balancing of the desirability of a shopping
center on a major traffic thoroughfare where it is accessible against the
possibility that a peculiar traffic problem would be compounded by com-
mercial development.1") Even if the facts of a case are such that charac-
13. Id. at 843. The court held that the ordinance did not bear a substantial rela-
tionship to the public health, safety, morals or welfare and that the residential restric-
tion was so arbitrary that it violated the due process clauses of both the federal and
state constitutions.
14. 15 N.J. 238, 250, 104 A.2d 441, 447-48 (1954). The court found that the
amendment constituted "spot zoning." It also held that the plot was suitable for the
residential use for which it was originally zoned, and that the rezoning could not be
justified on any of the standards prescribed in the state enabling act.
15. The appellant in this case had contended that a municipality's zoning respon-
sibility halts at its local boundaries regardless of its effect on adjoining and nearby land
beyond those boundaries. Id. at 245, 104 A.2d at 444. The court's contrary holding
was based on two factors: The first was the statutory language which prescribed that
"the master plan may include in its scope areas outside the boundaries of the munici-
pality." The second was a legislative authorization for county and regional planning
boards. Id. at 248-49, 104 A.2d at 447.
16. See Huttig v. City of Richmond Heights, 372 S.W.2d 833, 836-37 (Mo. 1963);
Wrigley Properties, Inc. v. City of Ladue, 369 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1963).
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terization may be accomplished by reference to the predominant develop-
ment, there remain variable factors which complicate comparative analysis.
Such analysis may not proceed solely by simple addition of the number of
commercial and residential units within a given region. For example, five
units in one shopping center, strategically located with respect to traffic and
accessibility may be given more weight than five separated units. Another
variable is the size of the geographic region on which the court bases its
characterization.
However, once a court has decided to proceed on the basis of compara-
tive analysis, has worked out the initial problems in that process and has
expressed a willingness to consider factors external to the zoning municipal-
ity, the hypothetical Figures serve as guides. Figure 1 describes the situation
in which the prevailing development, both internal and external, is resi-
dential and therefore inharmonious with a proposed commercial use. In
Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont," the New Jersey Supreme
Court in a similar situation referred to external development to fortify a
result that could have been reached by looking solely to internal develop-
ment. The essential characteristic of Figure 1 is that no conflict exists
between the prevailing internal and the prevailing external development.
Therefore, an analogous situation may be classified with Figure 1. Suppose
that the prevailing internal development is residential, but external land is
interspersed with both commercial and residential uses and there is no
preponderance of either. Because external development is inconclusive
and therefore neutral, a court would be guided by the only preponderance
that exists-the prevailing internal use."
Figure 2 describes essentially the situation faced by the Missouri Supreme
Court in Huttig v City of Richmond Heights.9 In Figure 2, reference to
internal development is inconclusive because no preponderance of either
commercial or residential exists. However, prevailing external development
is commercial and consideration of it will establish a regional preponderance
and a commercial characterization of the land in question. As in Figure 1
there is no conflict between the prevailing external and the prevailing
internal uses and a court would consider external factors as an aid to a
17. 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954) (discussed notes 14-15 supra and accompany-
ing text); accord, Hannifin Corp. v. City of Berwyn, I Ill. 2d 28, 115 N.E.2d 315
(1953) (land found unsuited for residential use).
18. See Louisville Timber & Wooden Prods. Co. v. City of Beechwood Village, 376
S.W.2d 690, 692 (Ky. 1964). The court recognized that external factors should be
considered, but in effect found those factors outweighed by a solid internal residential
preponderance.
19. 372 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. 1963) (discussed notes 11-13 supra and accompanying
text).
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decision that could go the same way solely on the basis of internal considera-
tions.
In Figure 3, however, there is a conflict between the prevailing internal
and the prevailing external uses. A court presented with this situation would
need to decide whether external considerations should dictate a result that
could not be reached on internal considerations alone. Even if a court is
willing to take this step there may be a necessity to make a corollary decision
with respect to the relative weights to be given to internal and external
factors. Suppose that internal development is sixty-five per cent residential
and external development is seventy-five per cent commercial. By completely
disregarding municipal borders and giving equal weight to internal and
external factors, a court would decide in favor of a composite preponderance
of commercial. There is language in the cases that would imply this
result.2" The implication of other judicial language, however, is that less
weight should be given to external factors because they are external.2 1
Figure 3 depicts a close case on the facts in which a court might be re-
luctant to substitute its judgment for that of the local zoning authorities. "
Further, none of the cases suggests that a municipality retains no degree of
autonomy in formulating local policies and that it cannot avoid having
decisions dictated to it by neighboring municipalities.
In Dowsey v. Village of Kensington,23 an owner contended that his land
20. See, e.g., Hannifin Corp. v. City of Berwyn, 1 Ill. 2d 28, 115 N.E.2d 315 (1953);
Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 245-48, 104 A.2d 441, 445-46
(1954). The court in Hannifin stated that "the fact that much of the contiguous in-
dustrial use is in adjoining Cicero [an adjacent municipality] is of no consequence, as it
is a question of existing conditions and not of geographical and territorial limits or of
the powers of neighboring municipalities." Id. at 36, 115 N.E.2d at 319. (Emphasis
added.) In this case an ordinance which restricted the land in question to residential
use was held invalid. The court found that the land was located in a "pocket" of in-
dustrial uses and was not suited for residential development.
21. See Huttig v. City of Richmond Heights, 372 S.W.2d 833, 842 (Mo. 1963), in
which the court stated that the zoning municipality had a duty to consider the matter
from a regional standpoint but qualified this statement with the words "at least to some
extent."
22. See Liberty Nat'l Bank v. City of Chicago, 10 Ill. 2d 137, 145-46, 139 N.E.2d
235, 240 (1956):
Under the evidence, the most that can possibly be said for the plaintiffs' case,
is that it presents a fairly debatable question as to whether the property on the
east side of Harlem Avenue should be characterized by the extensive residential
area to the east [internal] or by the business uses on the west side of the strcet
[external]. Under these circumstances, the question should be determined by the
city council and not by the courts.
In Huttig v. City of Richmond Heights, supra note 21, at 839, the Missouri Supreme
Court stated that local zoning is presumed to be valid.
23. 257 N.Y. 221, 177 N.E. 427 (1931); accord, Gartland v. Borough of Maywood,
45 N.J. Super. 1, 131 A.2d 529 (1957) (commercial use harmonious although all
adjacent land within zoning municipality zoned residential). For a discussion of Gart-
land, see note 10 supra.
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was unsuited for the residential use to which it had been restricted. The
New York Court of Appeals held the ordinance invalid even though
development within the zoning village was almost entirely residential. The
court stated that the land, situated at a salient point on the village's border,
was characterized by the overwhelming external commercial development
surrounding that point. Dowsey is an extreme example of conflict between
the prevailing internal and external uses. Because the regional preponder-
ance was so greatly commercial, the court's decision to weigh external factors
dictated its holding that the ordinance was invalid. Therefore, the case
provides no insight into the problem of the relative weights to be given to
the internal and external factors encountered in the close case depicted by
Figure 3.
B. Considering Extra-municipal Facilities in Testing the Validity of
Local Exclusions
Municipalities have traditionally been required to zone with regard to
municipal needs.2 If municipalities are viewed as isolated units, each is
required to authorize some land within its borders for commercial and
industrial development. These facilities would be necessary to provide its
inhabitants with places to shop and work. But the courts apparently are
beginning to depart from such a narrow view. They have indicated instead
that both commercial and industrial development may be excluded if
sufficient facilities are located in an adjacent community." The cases dis-
cussed in this subsection differ from those in the previous subsection in two
N ays. First, while both groups of cases are concerned with land uses in an
adjacent municipality, the land uses in these cases are considered in a
functional rather than in a physical sense. Second, although in both groups
of cases the land uses are located in an adjacent municipality, here land uses
need not be located in an area immediately adjacent to the zoning munci-
pality to be a relevant consideration.
In Valley View Village v. Proffett," the zoning village, located within a
large metropolitan area, had created a single-use residential district for the
entire village. A resident challenged the ordinance on the ground that no
industrial or commercial uses had been authorized. The Sixth Circuit
recognized that public need was the only justification for requiring the
24. E.g., O'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 202 P.2d 401 (1949); City of
Waxahachie v. Walkins, 154 Tex. 206, 275 S.W.2d 477 (1955); Edge v. City of Bell-
aire, 200 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
25. Valley View Village v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955); Duffcon Concrete
Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, I N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949).
26. 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955), reversing 123 F. Supp. 339 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
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village to provide industrial or commercial development. Finding the need
satisfied by industrial and commercial development outside the zoning
village, but within the general metropolitan area, the court upheld the
ordinance.
It would appear contrary to the very purposes of municipal planning to
require a village such as Valley View to designate some of its area for
business or industrial purposes without regard to the public need for
business or industrial uses. The council of such a village should not
be required to shut its eyes to the pattern of community life beyond the
borders of the village itself. We think that it is not clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable for a residential village to pass an ordinance preserving its
residential character, so long as the business and industrial needs of its
inhabitants are supplied by other accessible areas in the community atlarge. 2
The court adopted this view even though it recognized that traditionally a
municipality has been conceived as a self-contained unit providing for its
own residential, commercial and industrial areas.2"
In a similar case, Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill,0
the zoning ordinance divided the borough into four land-use districts-three
residential and one commercial. A property owner challenged the ordinance
partially on the ground that industrial uses could not be completely ex-
cluded. The court found that any local need for industrially-zoned land was
adequately satisfied by the availability of extensive bottom lands in an area
outside the borough's boundaries.30 It strongly indicated that the extra-
municipal area should be considered, stating that:
the effective development of a region should not and cannot be made to
depend upon the adventitious location of municipal boundaries, often
27. Id. at 418. (Emphasis added.) The district court decision, which the court of
appeals reversed, had held that the wording of the Ohio statute precluded municipalities
from exercising their zoning power in a manner that would limit an area to a single
use. The lower court had interpreted the statute as requiring the village council to
divide the municipality into districts. Proffett v. Valley View Village, 123 F. Supp. 339
(N.D. Ohio 1953). But the court of appeals in reversing held that the statute was
permissive and that "there is no requirement that in order to regulate and restrict it
must divide the municipality into more than one district." 221 F.2d at 416. Contra,
City of Moline Acres v. Heidbreder, 367 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. 1963).
28. Valley View Village v. Proffett, supra note 27.
29. 1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949).
30. Id. at 515, 64 A.2d at 351. The court concluded:
And where, as here, there exists a small residential municipality the physical
location and circumstances of which are such that it is best suited for contin-
uing residential development and, separated therefrom but in the same geo-
graphical region, there is present a concentration of industry in an area pecu-
liarly adapted to industrial development and sufficiently large to accommodate
such development for years to come, the power of the municipality to restrict
its territory to residential purposes with ampl provision for such small busi-
nesses, trades and light industries as are needed to serve the residents, is clear.
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prescribed decades or even centuries ago, and based in many instances
on considerations of geography, or commerce, or of politics that are no
longer significant with respect to zoning."'
It should be noted, however, that if the court upholds the exclusion or
partial exclusion of a use on the basis of regional development, a superficial
examination of the adequacy of regional development may lead ironically
to the encouragement of municipal parochialism. Some municipalities have
in the past sought to exclude uses such as hospitals, jails, sanitariums and
trailer courts because they are unpleasant or unattractive. Such attempts
have frequently been struck,32 although it is conceivable that an unwary
court might permit a municipality to exclude these uses notwithstanding
that from a regional standpoint the municipality is the most desirable loca-
tion. For example, a court might be led into this decision by convincing
evidence that land for these uses is provided in an adjacent municipality,
even though that municipality's allocation may be sufficient to satisfy only its
own needs. In such cases the court's role will be very difficult-at least until
intercommunity objectives are evaluated and expressed in a comprehensive
regional plan. 32
31. Id. at 513, 64 A.2d at 350. In this case, as in the Valley View case, municipal
zoning ordinances were upheld primarily because of extra-municipal development which
satisfied local needs. It is also possible, however, that a court will find for the municipal-
ity on the necessity question but hold the ordinances invalid on another ground. For
example, in Reynolds v. Barrett, 12 Cal. 2d 244, 83 P.2d 29 (1938), a property owner
challenged on two grounds an ordinance which restricted his land to a residential use.
First, he contended that his land should be zoned for commercial development because
there was an insufficient amount of commercially zoned land within the municipality.
Second, he contended that his land was unsuited for residential development because of
adjacent commercial development within the municipality. The court rejected the land-
owner's first contention after finding that the municipality was adequately served by
business located outside its borders in an adjacent municipality. It found that the zon-
ing city was primarily of residential character and that it was almost entirely surrounded
by a second city in which many commercial uses were located which adequately served
all parts of the zoning city. But the ordinance was declared invalid in its application to
the owner's land on the basis that adjacent commercial development within the zoning
municipality made his land unsuited for residential development. Id. at 250, 83 P.2d
at 33.
In both the Valley View and Duffcon cases the zoning municipality had completely
excluded the use for which there was an alleged need. In Reynolds, the zoning city had
allocated land for business uses, but it was alleged that it had not provided enough.
Although it was not indicated in the Reynolds opinion, it would seem that most courts
would be less likely to interfere with the legislative judgment in this type of case. As a
practical matter, courts would have a difficult time defining the point at which the land
authorized for business use is "enough."
32. Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land-Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. Rav. 515,
524 & n.26 (1957).
33. A conscientious determination of whether municipality "A" should be permitted
to exclude a particular use when enacting its zoning scheme, demands more than a quick
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C. The Duty of a Municipality to Zone for Regional Needs
The cases in which courts are asked to consider the duty of a municipality
to zone in order to meet regional needs are distinguishable from those dis-
cussed in the previous two subsections. First, a regional need is a concept
less tangible than either extra-municipal zoning and development or the
availability of extra-municipal facilities. The court must make a subjective
value judgment at the outset to determine that such a need exists.
A second and more fundamental distinction concerns the very scope of
a municipality's power to zone, which is based on the state's police power
to provide for the public health, safety, morals and welfare. 4 Traditionally,
the "public" for whose health, safety, morals or welfare a municipality must
zone has been conceived to include only the residents of the municipality
itself. This concept is not altered either by a consideration of extra-
municipal zoning and development in determining the validity of land-use
classifications, or by a consideration of extra-municipal facilities in determin-
ing the validity of local land-use exclusions. In the first situation the courts
extend marginally the area that will be considered in determining the validity
of a local land-use characterization. In the second the courts merely extend
the area that will be examined in determining whether local needs have been
met. But to find a municipal duty to zone in order to meet regional land-use
needs rests on an extension of the concept of "public" to include those who
live outside as well as within the zoning municipality.
Whether a municipal duty to zone can be based on regional needs is a
question that has been only partially answered. No court has directly faced
the question whether the satisfaction of regional needs is a proper ground for
upholding a zoning ordinance, and only two cases were found in which
courts have considered whether a local ordinance could be held invalid
because of its failure to satisfy a regional need."
look at an adjacent municipality (municipality "B") to ascertain whether "B" has allo-
cated enough land within its borders to that use to supply the needs of both "A" and "B"
for that facility. For example, although facilities in "B" are presently sufficient to satisfy
the needs of both "A" and "B", they may be insufficient in the future because of pro-
spective residential development in either municipality. Similarly, it may be that while
the facilities in "B" are more than adequate for both the present and prospective needs of
"A" and "B", those facilities must also be used by a third municipality ("C") which is
less able to provide for its own needs than "A". In both of the above situations it would
seem that "A" should not be permitted to exclude the use in question. This illustration
points up only two of the many possible regional questions which the court should ex-
amine in deciding these cases. A comprehensive regional plan would serve as a guide for
such decisions. In the absence of such a plan, the court must construct an ad hoc plan
for the region each time the question arises whether a local need is satisfied by facilities
in an adjoining municipality.
34. I YOKL Y, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICa § 15 (2d ed. 1953).
35. Wrigley Properties, Inc. v. City of Ladue, 369 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1963); Fanale
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Although no case has considered regional needs as factors in upholding an
ordinance, Andrews v. Board of Adjustment,36 upheld a variance to a
zoning ordinance which could only be granted on the showing of "special
reasons"' T arising in an area outside the municipality's borders. A variance
had been granted to permit the erection of a parochial school for residents
living outside the municipal boundaries. The court found that "a munici-
pality may provide cooperatively for the needs of neighboring communities
as well as their own."3 This language seems to indicate that the court
would sustain a zoning ordinance on the same ground-the satisfaction of a
regional need.
In both cases in which the courts were asked to find a zoning ordinance
invalid because of a regional need, the need was found insufficient to justify
overturning the ordinances. In Wrigley Properties, Inc. v. City of Ladue,3 9
land located on the municipal border had been zoned residential and the
landowner contended that the residential classification was not in the in-
terest of the public welfare because of the regional need for a shopping center
at that approximate location. The Missouri Supreme Court upheld the
ordinance principally because of the detrimental effects a shopping center
would have on local traffic conditions, water drainage and the value of
surrounding residential land. The court found the regional need insufficient
to overcome these local factors, noting that the shopping center could have
been erected across the street in an adjacent municipality on land which
had already been zoned for commercial use: "it does not sufficiently appear
v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 26 N.J. 320, 139 A.2d 749 (1958). In Pierro v.
Baxendale, 20 N.J. 17, 118 A.2d 401 (1955), the court refused to consider regional
needs in determining the validity of a local ordinance because the parties had neither
offered evidence nor requested the court to take judicial notice of the characteristics of
the surrounding territory.
36. 30 N.J. 245, 152 A.2d 580 (1959).
37. The state statute authorizing variances empowers the board of adjustment to:
Recommend in particular cases and for special reasons to the govering body
of the municipality the granting of a variance to allow a structure or use in a
district restricted against such structure or use. Whereupon the governing body
or board of public works may, by resolution, approve or disapprove such recom-
mendation. 40 N.J. STAT. A-.. § 55.39 (Supp. 1963). (Emphasis added.)
Usually a variance may only be given for "unnecessary hardships." The New Jersey
"special reasons" variance is unique. For a discussion of this variance see Cunningham,
Control of Land Use in New Jersey by Means of Zoning, 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 37, 77-81,
86-94 (1959).
38. Andrews v. Board of Adjustment, 30 N.J. 245, 251, 152 A.2d 580, 583 (1959).
39. 369 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1963). The principal argument advanced by the landowner
was that the growth and development of the region outside the zoning municipality had
been so extensive and had so changed conditions in the area that the rezoning of his land,
located on the municipal border, was necessary to satisfy the physical and economic needs
of the area.
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that any need therefore of the entire region cannot be provided outside of
Ladue but instead it reasonably could be found that there are available
nearby larger commercially zoned areas to do so." 4 This leaves open the
question of what the court would do if presented with a case in which the
land within the zoning municipality was the only land available and adapt-
able to satisfy the regional need.
In Fanale v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights,1 a landowner sought a
declaration invalidating the supplement to a zoning ordinance which pro-
hibited the erection of apartments for more than two families. The owner's
theory rested partially on the ground that the county in which the borough
was located needed more multiple dwelling units. Because of the compara-
tive size of the two entities the New Jersey Court denied a municipal obliga-
tion to leave land available for the satisfaction of the county need. Although
it previously had considered the inter-municipal aspects of zoning, the court
concluded that "it is quite another proposition to say that a municipality of
960 acres must accept uses it believes to be injurious, in order to satisfy the
requirements of a county."42 The court limited its holding by expressly
pointing out that this was not a case in which the municipality was the "last
hope for a solution" to the problem.4 3 The opinion did not indicate whether
the regional need would have been more decisive if the area in which it
existed had been smaller in comparison to the zoning borough.
The Wrigley and Fanale cases imply a municipal duty to satisfy regional
40. Id. at 402. The court did not squarely face the question whether a municipality
must provide for the needs, and therefore the welfare, of those who live outside its
boundaries. In discussing the zoning authority of the city under the state enabling act,
however, the court did state that "all this authority and these purposes are at least pri.
marily related to conditions within a city." Id. at 401. (Emphasis added.) This seems to
indicate a reluctance by the court to expand the concept of "public" for which the
municipality must zone. This conclusion is also supported by other language in the
opinion. In stating the reasons which supported the city council's refusal to rezone, the
court listed first "that the proposed use as a shopping center appears to be more for the
benefit of other cities and towns than for the benefit of Ladue [the zoning municipality]."
Id. at 402.
41. 26 N.J. 320, 139 A.2d 749 (1958).
42. IM. at 328, 139 A.2d at 753-54. This court also did not discuss the question of
whether a municipality's zoning power had to be exercised for the welfare of those in
the surrounding region as well as those within the municipality itself. But language in
the opinion indicates that its power need not be so limited. In considering the borough's
zoning authority, the court said that "although apartment houses were initially desirable,
a municipality may later conclude that more of them would be inimicable to its total
welfare." Id. at 326, 139 A.2d at 752. (Emphasis added.)
43. Id. at 328-29, 139 A.2d at 754. The court further stated: "There, of course, is
no suggestion that the county is so developed that Hasbrouck Heights [the zoning bor-
ough] is the last hope for a solution, and hence we do not have the question whether
under the existing statute the judiciary could resolve a crisis of that kind."
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needs, but offer equivocal answers to the question of what conditions must
exist before that duty arises. The Wrigley case suggests that the municipality
should provide for the regional need if in the adjacent region there is no
available land with which the regional need can be satisfied. The Fanale
case suggests that the sizes of the zoning municipality and the region in
which the need exists should be compared. The implied duty therefore
appears to be a severely qualified one which does not require the municipal-
ity to consider the best possible location for the needed facility. For example,
in Wrigley evidence indicated that the land available in the zoning munici-
pality was better suited for the shopping center than the commercially zoned
land across the street. Also a "preliminary land-use plan" of the county in
which the municipality was located indicated that a commercial use would
be desirable."' Similarly, in Fanale, although land was available in the
county for apartment building and the zoning borough was of comparatively
small size, the zoning borough may have been the most suitable location for
additional apartments from a regional standpoint because of its proximity
to industry and major transportation arteries.
Although it appears that an ad hoc balance was struck between municipal
autonomy and regional need, the role of the courts was no doubt hindered
by the absence of a comprehensive regional plan delineating the weight of
the factors to be weighed. Employment of a "rule of reason" or "balancing"
test necessitates a systematic source of information to guide the courts."
II. THE STANDING OF A NONRESIDENT TO CONTEST LOCAL ZONING
Closely related to extra-municipal considerations in determining the
validity of a zoning ordinance or amendment is the right of a nonresident
to oppose a zoning amendment before its passage or to challenge its validity
after it has been enacted. This question usually turns on the interpretation
given to a state statute or rule prescribing the persons who may challenge a
zoning amendment. These statutes typically authorize a challenge by
"parties in interest" or "persons aggrieved." 46 A few recent cases have
44. Wrigley Properties, Inc. v. City of Ladue, 369 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Mo. 1963).
45. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
46. State statutes specifying persons who are entitled to a hearing before the local
legislative body usually employ the phrase "parties in interest and citizens." E.g., Mo.
R v. STAT. § 89.050 (1959):
The legislative body of such municipality shall provide for the manner in
which such regulations and restrictions and the boundaries of such districts
shall be determined, established, and enforced, and from time to time amended,
supplemented, or changed. However, no such regulation, restriction, or bound-
ary shall become effective until after a public hearing in relation thereto, at
which parties in interest and citizens shall have an opportunity to be heard.
At least fifteen days' notice of the time and place of such hearing shall be pub-
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rejected the view that these statutes were meant only to include residents
of the zoning municipality. These cases have held that a nonresident may
have a sufficient interest to entitle him to be heard when a proposed change
is under consideration,47 to have his protest counted when that procedure is
authorized," to challenge action taken by the local board or council in the
district court 9 and to intervene as a matter of right in an action brought by
a resident property owner.5 ° They illustrate the attitude of some courts that
a municipality's zoning responsibility extends beyond its borders.
lished in an official paper or a paper of general circulation in such municipality.
(Emphasis added.)
State statutes specifying persons who are entitled to judicial review of local action
in the circuit court usually employ the phrase "person or persons jointly or generally
aggrieved." E.g., Mo. Rav. STAT. § 89.110 (1959):
Any person or persons jointly or severally aggrieved by any decision of the
board of adjustment, or any officer, department, board or bureau of the munic-
ipality, may present to the circuit court of the county or city in which the
property affected is located a petition, duly verified, setting forth that such
decision is illegal, in whole or in part, specifying the grounds of the illegality.
(Emphasis added.)
47. Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 247, 104 A.2d 441, 445-
46 (1954).
48. Koppel v. City of Fairways, 189 Kan. 710, 371 P.2d 113 (1962).
49. Hamelin v. Zoning Bd., 19 Conn. Supp. 445, 117 A.2d 86 (1955); Koppel v.
City of Fairway, supra note 48.
50. Roosevelt v. Beau Monde Co., 384 P.2d 96 (Colo. 1963). A landowner having
contracted to build a shopping center sought to have declared invalid a zoning ordinance
which restricted to residential use property located on the border of the zoning munici-
pality. The court recognized the right of six nonresidents who owned property adjacent
to the land in question to intervene on the side of the municipality. The state rule
authorizing intervention by right provided:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an ac-
tion . . . (2) when the representation of the applicant's interest by existing
parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by ajudgment in the action.. . CoL o. R. Crv. P. 24(a).
In applying this rule the court found that the nonresidents had interests which might
have been inadequately represented if intervention were not permitted because the at-
torney for the zoning municipality did not, and could not lawfully, represent their inter-
ests. Also it found that the rights of the nonresidents would be bound by a judgment
in the case. In examing the interests of the nonresidents the court pointed out that the
building of the proposed shopping center on the land in question "confers similar if
not identical benefits, or imposes similar if not identical detriments on the owners of
abutting property" whether they live in the zoning or in the adjacent municipality. Roose-
velt v. Beau Monde Co., supra at 100. But cf. Horn Constr. Co. v. Town of Hempstead,
33 Misc. 2d 381, 226 N.Y.S.2d 134 (Sup. Ct. 1962), in which an adjacent village was
not permitted to intervene in a suit contesting the validity of a zoning amendment which
restricted land located on the border of the zoning municipality to industrial use. The
adjacent village sought to intervene on the side of the zoning municipality because of
the increased strain which residential development would impose upon the village's
streets and services. The court found no evidence that the town would not adequately
represent the interest of the village and that it was not clear that the village would be
bound by the judgment in the action. On the basis of these findings, it held that the
village had no right to intervene.
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In Koppel v. City of Fairway,5 the protests of nonresidents had been
ignored by the city council in passing a zoning amendment which rezoned
land on the city's border from residential to commercial. The Kansas
Supreme Court was faced with two questions: whether the nonresidents
had the right to have protests considered by the council in the planning
stages and whether nonresidents had standing to bring an action in the
district court to have the council's action reviewed. The court answered
both questions in the affirmative and sustained the lower court's overruling
of the city's demurrer. The court interpreted the protest statute-authoriz-
ing those owning land directly in front or to the rear of the land being
considered for rezoning to submit protests-to include all property owners
within the prescribed areas regardless of residency. 2 Similarly, the court in-
terpreted the statute authorizing "affected property owners" to challenge
the council's action in the district court to include nonresidents who owned
adjacent property.53
51. 189 Kan. 710, 371 P.2d 113 (1962).
52. The section of the Kansas statute which discusses the procedure for notice and
hearings contains the following provision concerning protests:
If, however, a protest against such amendment, supplement, or change be pre-
sented, duly signed and acknowledged by the owners of twenty percent or
more of any frontage proposed to be altered, or by the owners of twenty per-
cent of the frontage immediately in the rear thereof, or by the owners of
twenty percent of the frontage directly opposite a frontage proposed to be
altered, such amendment shall not be passed except by at least four-fifths vote
of the council or board of commissioners. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-708
(1949).
As can be deduced from the statute, the right of the nonresidents to have their protests
considered may have a significant effect on whether the ordinance passes.
53. The section of the Kansas statute which authorizes property owners to contest
ordinances in the courts provides:
That any ordinance or regulation provided for or authorized by this act shall
be reasonable, and any taxpayer or any other person having an interest in prop-
erty affected, may have the reasonableness of any ordinance or regulation deter-
mined by bringing an action, in the district court of the county in which such
city is situated, against the governing body of said city. KAN. GFN. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-712 (1949). (Emphasis added.)
Three justices dissented in this case, two of whom wrote opinions. Justice Robb's
dissent states that neither statute was meant to give any right to nonresidents to contest
zoning ordinances. He disagrees with the majority both in regard to the nonresidents'
right to have their protests considered and in regard to their right to contest the validity
of the ordinance in the courts. In arriving at this conclusion he reasoned:
I do not believe that a municipality or the citizen of any municipality can exer-
cise extra-territorial power over another municipality or the land contained
therein. This is neither an injunction nor a nuisance action but is, in my opin-
ion, an interference by the citizens of one municipality with a governmental
function of another municipality, namely, its city planning. We cannot ignore
the age-old rule that one city has no control over the government of another
city which I think should be applicable not only to legislative functions but
also to the executive and judicial function of a city. Id. at 716, 371 P.2d at
117.
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It is not clear what the nature of a nonresident's interest must be before
he will be allowed to challenge the zoning of an adjacent municipality. In
most cases the nonresident owned property adjacent to that for which a
zoning change was contemplated. Without exception, ownership of adjacent
property has been held a sufficient interest to support the challenge." But
the holding of one case suggests that an interest less than that of an adjacent
property owner may be sufficient. In Hamelin v. Zoning Bd.," six non-
residents sought to review the zoning commission's decision to extend the
borough's business zone. The Connecticut court recognized the rights of
all the nonresidents to be heard by the commission and to review the
commission's action even though only one owned adjacent property. The
only interest of the nonresidents mentioned by the court was their status as
resident taxpayers of the adjacent town.
CONCLUSION
Most cases discussing extra-municipal problems in zoning, although such
cases are as yet infrequent, indicate an increasing judicial awareness of both
the physical and functional relationships of adjacent municipalities. This
recognition of inter-municipal relationships will encourage municipalities to
look beyond their borders in allocating or reallocating land uses and, in this
sense, it is a step toward counteracting the effects of the fragmentation of
metropolitan area. This step, however, has necessarily been a short one
because the courts are limited to case-by-case determinations and hence
they lack the capacity to develop a comprehensive zoning policy either in
prohibiting conflicts at municipal borders or in providing proper balances of
facilities throughout entire regions. If there is to be an adequate solution
Justice Fatzer, in his dissent, interpreted the protest statute as follows:
The only reasonable and feasible interpretation, in my opinion, is that effective
protests may be made only by those owners of frontage affected, or frontage
opposite or to the rear of the affected lands, where the frontage owned by the
protesting party is located within the city whose ordinance is proposed to be
amended. Any other result is contrary to settled concepts of government and
law of this state. Id. at 717, 371 P.2d at 118.
Justice Fatzer declined to express an opinion on the question whether nonresidents had
a right to have the council's action reviewed in the courts.
He said that it was "not necessary to now determine whether objecting plaintiffs have
such an interest as would entitle them to seek judicial relief against unreasonable or
arbitrary action by the governing body of the city of Fairway." Id. at 716, 371 P.2d at
118.
54. Roosevelt v. Beau Monde Co., 384 P.2d 96, 100 (Colo. 1963); Koppel v. City
of Fairway, 189 Kan. 710, 714, 371 P.2d 113, 116 (1962); Borough of Cresskill v.
Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 247, 104 A.2d 441, 445-46 (1954).
55. 19 Conn. Supp. 445, 117 A.2d 86 (1955).
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to metropolitan zoning problems, it must be achieved through the adoption
of a comprehensive regional plan encompassing the entire metropolitan
area, and comprehensive zoning enacted either on a regional scale or by
separate municipalities acting cooperatively. By these means an affirmative
policy for the development of land at municipal borders can be legislated
in advance, and facilities may be located in the most suitable areas irrespec-
tive of geographic boundaries.
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